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Ramdass v. Angelone
187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1999)
I. Facts
On September 2,1992, Bobby Lee Ramdass (Ramdass") shot and killed
Mohammed Kayani ("Kayani") during a robbery of a "7-11" store in Fairfax
County, Virginia. Ramdass entered the store ahead of his four companions
and aimed his gun at Kayani, who was working behind the cash register.
The other men with Ramdass included Darrell Wilson ("Wilson"), Shane
Singh ("Singh"), Edward O'Connor ("O'Connor"), and Candelerio Ramirez
("Ramirez"). Wilson also had a gun in his possession.'
Wilson ordered the customers to lie down on the floor. The other
three men took the customers' wallets and money from the store's cash
register. At this point, Ramdass ordered Kayani to open the store's safe.
Kayani tried unsuccessfully. Ramdass became angered and yelled at Kayani
to open the safe. Wilson then fired a shot at one of the customers. Ramdass
then shot Kayani in the head because "he took too long." Ramdass clicked
his gun at the customers on the floor before he exited the store.2 The men
divided the robbery proceeds?
Following a jury trial in Fairfax County, Ramdass was convicted of
capital murder in the commission of an armed robbery and use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony. The jury recommended a death sentence
based upon the future dangerousness predicate.'
During the sentencing phase, the jury heard evidence of Ramdass's
lengthy criminal record and his pattern of recidivism. They also heard that
the Kayani murder was part of the sixth robbery in an eight-day crime
spree. During their deliberations, the jury inquired whether Ramdass would
be eligible for parole. The judge instructed the jury that they were not to
concern themselves with what happened after the imposition of verdict.'
1. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Va. 1993).
2. Id. Ramirez testified that Ramdass clicked the gun at the customers before leaving
the store. One of the customers also heard the gun click. There was testimony at trial that
the cartridges in the gun were smaller than those specified for the gun. Therefore, if the gun
were pointed down, it could not be fired. Id.
3. Id.
4. Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 400 (4th Cir. 1999). See VA. CODE ANN.
19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).

5. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 400. Defense counsel objected to the judge's instruction that
jurors should impose such punishment as they feel is just under the evidence and within the
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At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the jury should
not recommend the death penalty because Ramdass would be ineligible for
parole under the three-strikes provision of the Virginia Code.6 The court
sentenced7 Ramdass to death; the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
sentence.
Ramdass then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court. Before his petition was reviewed, the Court decided
Simmons v. South Carolina.8 In Simmons, the Court held that when a state
seeks a death sentence on the basis of defendant's future dangerousness, the
defendant is entitled to inform the jury that he is parole-ineligible if the only
alternative sentence to death is life without the possibility of parole.9 In
light of this decision, the Court remanded Ramdass's case to the Supreme
Court of Virginia for reconsideration."
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia, concluding that Simmons
was inapposite, reaffirmed Ramdass's death sentence." The court decided
that Ramdass was eligible for parole at the time of the sentencing, because
at that time he had only been convicted of two felonies. The two felonies
that the court considered were a 1992 robbery of a Pizza Hut and the
Kayani murder. The court did not consider a guilty verdict for a robbery
of a Domino's Pizza to be a predicate offense under the statute because,
although he had already been found guilty, the court had not yet entered
judgment on that verdict at the time of Ramdass's sentencing for the Kayani
murder. 2
In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Ramdass again argued
that Simmons required that a capital jury be informed of a defendant's parole
ineligibility. He also asserted that he was denied the reasonable assistance
of a mental health expert and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because they failed to investigate and object to the appointment
instructions of the Court ... [the jurors] are not to concern themselves with what may
happen afterwards." Id.
6. See VA. CODEANN. S 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1999). Parole was abolished on January
1, 1995. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 1999). Geriatric parole is available to convicted felons, except those convicted of capital murder. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01 (Michie
1999).
7. Ramdass, 437 S.E.2d at 573-74.
8. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
9. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 177 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. Ramdass v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994).
11. Ramdass, 450 S.E.2d at 361 (Va. 1994).
12. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 401 (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 707, 709 (Va.
1922)). Smith held that a conviction requires an entry of judgment. Smith, 113 S.E. at 709.
But cf Jewel v. Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d 264, 268-69 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, for
purposes of impeachment, a conviction accrues when guilt is found rather than when
sentence is imposed).
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of a particular mental health expert." The Supreme Court of Virginia
decided that the Simmons claim was not reviewable because the issue had
already been decided on direct appeal.14
Ramdass then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Virginia. In his petition, he alleged the following: (1) that the
trial court's failure to permit the jury to consider his parole ineligibility was
unconstitutional; (2) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
because they failed to investigate the background of the appointed mental
health expert; and (3) that his right to assistance of a mental health expert
had been violated. The district court granted habeas relief based on the
Simmons claim and dismissed the other claims. Both parties appealed." On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Commonwealth contended that
the Simmons claim was defaulted and that Simmons was not applicable
because Ramdass was not parole-ineligible under Virginia law. On crossappeal, Ramdass asserted that the district court erred in dismissing the
following claims: 16 (1) that his due process rights were violated by the
determination that he was eligible for parole at the time of his sentencing;
(2) that his due process rights were violated by the denial of assistance of a
mental health expert;" (3) that he did not receive effective assistance of
counsel; and (4) that his due process rights were violated by the denial of
funds for expert assistance."
13. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 401. Ramdass asserted this right under bothAke 'v.Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that a defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right, in some
circumstances, to access to a psychiatrist), and section 19.2-264.3:1 of the Virginia Code. See
VA. CODE S 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1999) (providing for expert assistance when defendant's
mental condition is relevant to capital sentencing).
14. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 402 (citing Hawks v. Cox, 175 S.E. 2d 271 (Va. 1970) (holding
that an issue decided against defendant on direct appeal may not be considered again on postconviction review)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 408.
17. Ramdass's claim relating to the denial of mental health expert assistance will not
be discussed at length in this summary because the court's ruling is briefly stated and provides
little insight for defense counsel.
Ramdass advanced two theories challenging the district court's dismissal of this claim:
(1) that the denial of expert assistance violated his rights under Ake, and (2) that the denial
violated section 19.2-264.3:1 of the Virginia Code. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 408-09. The court
found that the Ake claim was not defaulted, as urged by the Commonwealth, because
Ramdass fairly presented his claim to the state court. Id. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that Ake was not implicated because (1) Ramdass did not show at trial that his mental status
was at issue and (2) the Commonwealth did not use expert mental health evidence in the
sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at 409. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Ramdass's
claim based on section 19.2-264.3:1 of the Virginia Code. The court concluded that this claim
was procedurally defaulted because it was based solely upon Ramdass's rights under the state
statute. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1999).
18.
This claim is not discussed in detail in this summary because the court dismissed it
in a summary fashion. The court reasoned that because Ramdass failed to show that there
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IL Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
Simmons did not control this case because Ramdass was not ineligible for
parole under Virginia law.19 The court reversed the district court's grant of
habeas relief on the Simmons claim and affirmed denial of the other issues.20
III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. The Commonwealth's Appeal
1. The Simmons Claim
Although Ramdass raised his Simmons claim to the Supreme Court of
Virginia on three occasions (in his direct appeal of the sentence, on remand
from the United States Supreme Court after the Simmons decision, and in
his state habeas corpus petition),2 1 the Commonwealth contended that the
claim was defaulted under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996.22 The court found this contention to be factually accurate, but
noted that the Commonwealth's classification of Ramdass's Simmons claim
for this purpose was "unduly narrow." 23 The Fourth Circuit considered the
fact that Ramdass raised a broad Simmons claim in these three instances to
be "compelling evidence" that the claim was not defaulted.24
Applicability ofSimmons
The court stated that the application of Simmons requires a two-step
analysis.2 5 In the first step, the Commonwealth must base its death penalty
argument upon future dangerousness. Ramdass met this requirement.
2.

was anything wrong with his counsel or his experts, he therefore failed to establish a prima
fade case as to his ineffective assistance of counsel or mental health expert claims. Ramdss,
187 F.3d at 410. The court affirmed the district court's denial of funds for expert assistance
and denial of an evidentiary hearing. Id.
19. Id. The court noted that Simmons only applies in cases where -state law renders
the defendant legally, not merely practically, ineligible for parole." Id.
20.
Id.
21. Id. at 402.
22.
28 U.S.C. Title 153, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b) (barring
consideration of federal habeas claims if petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies).
23. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 402. The court recognized that Ramdass did not "specifically
contest the parole eligibility determination in his state habeas petition, but concluded that
he had preserved the claim by reason of the broader claim he did assert: that the trial court's
refusal to give the jury his parole eligibility information violated his due process rights. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 404.
26. Id. The Commonwealth argued that Ramdass presented a "continuing serious
threat to society." Id.
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Secondly, the only available alternative to a death sentence must be life
without the possibility of parole." The second step of the test was the
major issue in this appeal.
In its analysis, the court stressed that Simmons requires a state-law
determination of parole ineligibility rather than a common sense impossibility of parole as Ramdass urged. The court reasoned that under Ramdass's
argument any defendant who is unlikely to be paroled would be eligible for
a Simmons instruction. However, the court concluded that Ramdass did
not satisfy the second step of the Simmons test because the Supreme Court
of Virginia had already determined that he was not ineligible for parole at
the time of the sentencing. 0
This reliance on a legal technicality, in effect, denied Ramdass his right
to deny or explain the prosecution's evidence of future dangerousness.31
The court construed the determination of parole eligibility to be a legal
determination, not a factual or logical question. 2 In the dissenting opinion,
Justice Murnaghan applied Simmons differently. 33He reasoned that Simmons
is about access to juries, not legal technicalities.
B. Ramdass's Cross-Appeal
1. Supreme Court of Virginia'sInterpretationofParoleIneligibility
Ramdass argued that the Supreme Court of Virginia arbitrarily interpreted the three-strikes provision in the determination that he was eligible
for parole. 4 The court held that this claim was procedurally defaulted
27. Id.
28. Id. at 405. The court pointed to the text in Simmons as requiring a state-law
determination: "[W]here the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law
prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be
informed that the defendant is parole ineligible." Id. (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156). The
court noted that the requirement of a state-law determination is present in several places in
the text of the Simmons decision. Id.
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on Smith in defining what constituted
a conviction. Id. at 404. This instance was the first time that the court cited Smith since the
1920s. Id. at 408.
31. See id. at 411 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Murnaghan stressed that Ramdass was denied his elemental due process: "[s]plitting hairs
when a man's life is at stake is not becoming to a judiciary or legal system. I do not believe
that due process requires or allows such arbitrary results." Id. at 415. He also noted that
.the scope and parameter of the Simmons right is a matter of federal constitutional law." Id.
at 413. Under Gardnerv.Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977), the Supreme Court held that "elemental due process requires that a defendant not be sentenced to death on the basis of information
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." Id. at 362.
32. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 407.
33. Id. at 414.
34. Id. at 408.
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because it had not been raised in state court." The court found no merit in
Ramdass's contention that the claim had been considered within
3 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion that he was parole eligible.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Ramdass also advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Because trial counsel failed to object to the appointment of a mental health
expert who was not favorable to the defense and they did not seek assistance
from another expert, Ramdass argued that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. 7 Under Stricklandv. Washington" Ramdass needed to show
(1) that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that prejudice ensued.39 The district court assumed,
arguendo, that the deficiency prong was met, but concluded that this claim
was defeated because Ramdass was unable to show prejudice.' The Fourth
Circuit agreed with this reasoning, noting that the jury heard evidence from
family members as well as a probation officer and that Ramdass could not
"show that psychiatric testimony as to the same circumstances would
produce a different result." 4 '
IV Epilogue
Ramdass was scheduled to be executed on November 23, 1999.42 Soon
after he had eaten his last meal and less than three hours before his execution, the United States Supreme Court stayed the execution-the fourth stay
issued by the Court in Virginia this year.43 Although the grounds on which
the Court issued the stay are not clear, two major issues in the petition were
the jury instruction on Ramdass's eligibility for parole and his lack of an
unbiased mental health expert."
Ashley Flynn
35.
Id.
36. Id. The court stated that Ramdass's contention was too broad: "Carried to its
logical conclusion, Ramdass's argument would mean that every judicial ruling carries with
it an implicit, due process rubber stamp." Id.
37. Id. at 409.
38.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
40. Ramdass, 187 F.3d at 410.
41.
Id.
42.
Tim McGlone, Virginia Will Execute Record 14th Inmate If Appeal Fails, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Hampton Roads, Virginia), November 22, 1999, at Al.
43.
The other defendants were: Terry Williams, on April 2; Lonnie Weeks, on September 1; and Michael Williams, on October 29. Frank Green, Ramdass Execution Is Stayed,
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, November 24, 1999, at Al.
44.
Id.

